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Judith T. Younger

Medicine and Law:
Making Excellent Time But Lost
Problems posed by recent developments in medical science are
outstripping the law's ability to articulate consensus-based
solutions. Some important values are compromised no matter what
is done. Under the circumstances, says the author, the law should
abstain from the fray for its own good.
"11

ood afternoon

ladies and
gentlemen, this is the pilot speaking.
We are flying at an altitude of 35,000
feet and a speed of 700 miles an
hour. I have two pieces of news to
report, one good and one bad. The
bad news is that we are lost. The
good news is that we are making
excellent time."
Like the aircraft in the story,
medicine today is making excellent
time. The cures doctors have
discovered, the interventions of
which they are capable, and the
techniques they have developed are
truly remarkable. The bad news is
that the law, in trying to keep up
with these medical miracles, is losing
ground. Its responses to problems
posed by medical advances are
imperfect at best, disastrous at worst,
and costly in terms of lost credibility.
The moral problems created by
modern medicine have no entirely
satisfactory solutions: there is no
consensus about how to handle them
since some important values will be
compromised no matter what is
done. If the law takes a clear-cut
position in favor of one set of values
over another, it is likely to be
evaded or ignored by those who
think it has decided in favor of the
wrong set of values. If the law,
instead of taking a clear stand for
one set of values over another, takes
a compromise position, it is likely to
be unworkable when it is applied to
actual facts. The dilemmas created
by medical advances seem to cry out

for resolution but at the same time
they resist resolution because there is
no certainty or agreement on what
resolution is right. On such issues,
the law, for its own good, should
abstain from the fray and stay silent
until it can act on the basis of
consensus, secure in the expectation
that, because it rests upon consensus,
it will be followed and that the
solutions it provides will work.
Roe v. Wade: An Historic
Compromise?
At the beginning of life, that most
controversial issue - abortion offers a ready example. We look at
the abortion dilemma today as
demanding a very clear-cut choice
between conflicting values - the life
of the fetus against the mother's right
to self-determination. It is easy to

forget that not very long ago
abortion was a dangerous procedure
for mothers. Then criminal abortion
laws could be justified as protecting
both mother and child. Modern
medicine changed all that. It made
abortion early in pregnancy a safe
procedure - it is as safe or safer
than childbirth. The states,
nevertheless, kept their criminal
abortion laws on the books; these
statutes then represented a clear-cut
choice by the law of fetal life over
mother's rights. There was certainly
no consensus among doctors as to
which of these competing values
should be preferred nor was there
any consensus in society as a whole.
In any event, criminal abortion
laws in the United States were
evaded or ignored. Abortions
continued. If a woman could pay,
she could find an American doctor to
do the job or she could go abroad.
Those who could not afford either
option often resorted to doing it
themselves with sometimes fatal
results.
It was at this juncture that the
Supreme Court of the United States
decided Roe v. Wade., Faced with

the question of the validity of the
Texas and Georgia criminal abortion
laws, the Court, like the state
legislatures before it, could have
taken a stand in favor of one
conflicting set of values over the
other. But it didn't. Instead it chose
compromise. The justices
acknowledged their awareness
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. .of the sensitive and emotional
nature of the abortion controversy, of
the vigorous opposing views, even
among physicians, and of the deep
and seemingly absolute convictions
that the subject inspires. 2
They went on, like Caesar describing
Gaul, to divide a pregnancy in three
parts. The first trimester they left to
the mother - here her right to selfdetermination was paramount. The
second trimester was contested
territory - in this period the
mother's rights could be restricted by
state legislation aimed at protecting,
not the fetus, but the mother's
health. The Court equated the
beginning of the third trimester with
the time when a fetus could survive
outside the womb. After this point,
the Court said, the state could act to
protect fetal life, even if it meant
proscribing abortion.
Has the Court's historic
compromise solved the problem? Of
course not. Believers in prolife
doctrine bomb and burn abortion
clinics, often going unpunished or
getting off with lenient treatment.
States continue to pass regulations
restricting abortion, testing the outer
limits of Roe v. Wade.
The Supreme Court has invalidated
a number of these regulations since
1973, 3 pleasing prochoice forces, but
four of its decisions have done much
to return the status quo to that
which existed before the Court
entered the controversy. In 1977, in
three companion cases, the Court
held that states were not required by
either the Constitution or federal law
to pay for nontherapeutic abortions4
and in 1980, that Congress, through
the Hyde Amendment, could prevent
use of federal funds for most
medically necessary abortions as
well.' The net result is that abortions
are available except to poor women
in 36 states; 14 states, despite the
Court's decisions, continue to fund
abortions on their own.
The Court's compromise solution is
certainly not perfect and may very
well be impermanent. Congress could
initiate a constitutional amendment
to overrule the Court. At least two
newpaper columnists have concluded

reported to be just around the
corner. 9 When that happens, the
reasoning of Roe v. Wade will be
completely obsolete and its credibility
not merely diminished but down to
zero.

that in the wake of the last election,
there is an antiabortion majority in
the House of Representatives and the
Senate is too close to call on the
question.6 Or the Court could
overrule itself: when the Supreme
Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973,
the prochoice margin was five'; now
it is one.'
Quite apart from legislative or
judicial action, the Court's
compromise is vulnerable to
developments in medicine. Medical
advances make fetuses born earlier
than the second trimester more and
more viable. As the period of
viability increases, does the period in
which abortion is permitted decrease?
And what does the Court's reasoning
look like in view of the possibility of
ectogenesis? In vitro fertilization has
become commonplace; the ability to
grow a baby to term under
laboratory conditions is reliably

"The ability to grow a
baby to term under
laboratory conditions is
reliably reported to be
just around the corner."
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In the Matter of Baby M: Solomon
Revisited
Divorcing the generation of human
life from human sexuality is hardly
new anymore. It began with artificial
insemination and if it does progress
to its ultimate conclusion, will pose a
number of profound questions.
Consider the impact of a new
nonbiologically related progenitor,
the embryologist-geneticist-doctor,
and a new home for generation, the
laboratory rather than the womb, on
traditional legal definitions of
families and the rights and duties
that flow from family relationships.
Whose legal responsibility will these
nontraditional babies be? And who
will be liable for any physical or
emotional defects resulting from the
nontraditional way in which they
were made?
These issues are foreshadowed by
the current use of artificial
insemination to facilitate so-called
"surrogate motherhood", a practice
which surfaced in the United States
about 1976 and which has become
increasingly popular since then. In a
contemporary surrogate motherhood
arrangement, a childless couple
typically pays a surrogate to be
artificially inseminated with the
husband's sperm. The wife, unable to
have her own baby, then adopts the
baby because the law regards the
surrogate as the legal mother. The
surrogate, for her part, agrees to
donate her egg and womb and, on
birth of the baby, to relinquish
custody immediately. (Under a less
common but increasingly frequent
arrangement, the surrogate is just a
carrier who has consented to be
impregnated with a fertilized egg and
who has no genetic connection to the
baby she bears).
Is this "giving life" as those who
approve the practice vociferously say
or is it "selling babies", as those who
condemn it argue? The question has

been widely publicized lately in
connection with In the Matter of

Baby M,11 a case in which a
surrogate mother, after signing a
surrogate agreement of the usual
kind (she donated her egg and
womb), changed her mind. She
refused the money and made off with
the baby. The natural father and his
wife sued to recover it. Here, as in
the case of abortion, is a dilemma
which, no matter how it is decided,
will compromise some recognized
values. On the plaintiff's side are the
right to procreate and the rights of
the natural father to his children; on
the defendant's side are the same
rights of the natural mother to her
children, as well as a public policy
embodied in adoption and other laws
against selling babies or making them
the subjects of ordinary contracts.
And, as on the subject of abortion,
there is fierce disagreement in this
society about which values are most
important in arriving at a solution.
Under the thesis of this article, this
makes surrogate motherhood a
subject which the law should not
address. So far, state legislatures
have stayed away from it but the
Baby M case is now squarely before
a court. What might the court do?
The court might refuse to hear the
case, saying this is not one of the
situations for which the law provides
a remedy, and direct that the parties
be left to settle the dispute
themselves. (At least four other
similar cases have been settled
quietly outside court.") The court
could look on this as merely an
aspect of an already well-settled
situation - that which occurs when
a husband, instead of a wife, is
unable to have a baby. Sperm is
donated to the would-be parents and
the wife is artificially inseminated
with her husband's consent. In those
cases statutes make it clear that the
sperm donor has no rights to the
baby.12 The court could stretch that

solution to apply to donations of an
egg and a womb. If it did so, it
would give the baby to the father
and his wife. The court could treat
the case as an ordinary contract
matter and employ usual contract

rules. It might find that the surrogate
mother breached the contract. It
could then require her to pay
damages or to return the baby. Or
the court could treat the contract as
unenforceable because the payment
to the surrogate mother violates laws
prohibiting the sale of babies. This
would leave the baby with the
surrogate mother. (The opposing
lawyer, of course, would argue that
the payment was not for the baby
but for services rendered or rent.) Or
the court could decide the case as if
the baby were the product of a
divorcing couple's union. The
standard for awarding custody then
would be the best interests of the
child.
The court, so far, has ordered the
surrogate mother to turn the baby
over to the father and his wife
pending its ultimate decision, but it
has awarded the surrogate mother
visiting rights, Perhaps it is on the

"Given some consensus
about surrogate
motherhood, legislators
can act. Their laws
would then have a good
chance of being
followed."

verge of a Solomonic solution,
dividing the baby in half, or
awarding it jointly to both contesting
families.
The first option, that the court
decline to act and leave the parties to
their own devices, is to my mind
preferable. But any of these
possibilities is better than a statute
on the subject. A judicial decision,
unlike a statute, affects only the
parties to it. It can be overruled by
the court which made it; it doesn't
bind coordinate or higher courts or
courts in other jurisdictions. They
could reach other solutions to similar
problems. When, as a result of
experience, differences of opinion
give way to some consensus about
surrogate motherhood, legislators can
act. Their laws would then have a
good chance of being followed.
The Limitations of "Baby Doe"
At the other end of the spectrum,
dying, similar issues arise. Doctors
can control death: for almost any
condition that makes a person
terminally ill, some medical
intervention is available that can
postpone death. Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, blood transfusion,
machines that breathe and perform
other bodily functions for people
who can no longer perform them for
themselves, sophisticated methods for
transplanting natural and artificial
body organs and parts - these are
but a few of the options available.
Of course, doctors can hasten death
as well, making it swift and painless.
In October 1986 a seven-month-old
child, Lance Tyler Steinhaus, was
brought to University Hospital
(Minneapolis) after his own father
assaulted him.'3 Lance's heart was
beating and he was breathing. He
was not "brain dead" but doctors
said that the upper part of his brain,
which controls thought and
personality, was so severely damaged
that he had no hope of recovery.
The question was how to treat him.
Should he be kept alive, using all the
medical marvels at hand, or should
some of them be withheld allowing
him to die? The child's father,
mother, doctors, and welfare officials
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couldn't agree. These are the facts.
What of the law?
The law, both state and federal,
says that "withholding medically
indicated treatment from a disabled
infant with a life-threatening
condition" is child abuse and neglect
unless, "in the treating physician's ...
reasonable medical judgment ...the
infant is chronically and irreversibly
comatose."14 These federal and state
laws are so-called Baby Doe laws.
They were the legislative response to
the practice of leaving the fate of
defective newborn babies to their
doctors and families. The specific
cases that triggered their enactment
were those of an Indiana couple
who, in 1982, let their Downs
Syndrome baby die, and of a New
York couple who, in 1983, refused to
consent to surgery for their baby
who had spina bifida and
hydrocephalus.15 The statutes, though
triggered by problems arising with
defective newborns, are not restricted
in application to them.
The Baby Doe laws do not choose
one set of values over the other; like
Roe v. Wade, they reflect
compromise - an uneasy and
imprecise political compromise
between fiercely disagreeing groups:
those who believe that life, whatever
its quality, must be preserved, and
those who believe that life without
hope of recovery is no life at all. It is
no wonder then that when the laws
were invoked to solve the impasse
between Lance's mother and doctors,
on the one hand, who wanted to
withhold aggressive medical
treatment, and his father and the
Welfare Department, on the other,
who wanted to keep the child alive,
they didn't work. Lance, according
to his doctors, showed some
characteristics of a person "in a
permanent vegetative state". Under
the Baby Doe laws, withholding
medical treatment from him if he
were in this condition would be child
abuse and neglect; doctors would
have to continue to treat him
aggressively. Lance also showed some
characteristics of a person in "chronic
and irreversible coma". Under the
Baby Doe laws, withholding medical

well.1 7 So were the doctors. Said
one: "The courts are trying to make
decisions in a vacuum in abstract
terms on day-to-day medical
decisions ..."18
Refusals Ignored and Gifts Refused

treatment from him if he were in this
condition would not be child abuse
and neglect; doctors would be able to
withhold treatment.
Because Lance's condition didn't fit
precisely into the statutory exception,
the court ordered doctors to continue
treatment despite their better
judgment.16 The case was settled only
when the five lawyers, one for each
parent, one representing Lance, one
representing the Welfare Department,
and one representing the doctors,
agreed on the child's treatment.
Lance would continue to receive food
and water. If he stopped breathing or
if his breathing became difficult or if
his heart stopped beating he would
not be resuscitated or have a tube
put down his throat to aid breathing;
nor would be be put on life support
machines. The lawyers involved in
the case were quoted as agreeing that
the Baby Doe laws didn't work

"The Baby Doe laws

reflect compromisean uneasy and imprecise
compromise between
fiercely disagreeing
groups.

18/The Bench & Bar of Minnesota, February 1987

A few months before Lance's
problems were being aired in the
news, reporters were following
another case - that of Kathleen
Farrell.19 Farrell, a 37-year- old
mother of two teenagers, was
suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease.
She was not in a hospital or nursing
home but rather in her own home.
She was sustained by a respirator
which breathed for her and she was
being fed liquids through a syringe.
She was mentally competent, though
completely paralyzed except for her
eye muscles and lips. She wanted to
stop her treatment.
Here the law has taken a clear
stance about which set of conflicting
values is to provide the solution.
Mrs. Farrell, it says, as the patient,
has the right to refuse treatment
though her refusal will result in her
death. It finds this answer in the
common law right of selfdetermination and the constitutional
right to privacy. 20 But despite the
law, neither Mrs. Farrell's doctor nor
her husband was willing to take
responsibility for carrying out her
wishes.
Here, again, is an issue on which
members of our society disagree.
Any resolution requires a
compromise of some accepted values.
There are those who believe that
disconnecting Mrs. Farrell's respirator
would be "undertreatment of the
living" tantamount to murder, and
those who believe that to keep her
attached to it, especially against her
will, would be "overtreatment of the
dying" and an unjustifiable violation
of her right to death with dignity.
Though the intermediate appellate
court of Mrs. Farrell's state upheld
her right to refuse treatment, it
stayed its own judgment till the
lawyer representing her two children
could appeal to the next highest
court. 2 1 Mrs. Farrell remained
hooked to the respirator till she died,

just one day before that court was to
hear the argument in her case.
Mrs. Farrell is not an isolated
example: blood transfusions and
other forms of medical treatment
have been imposed on competent
patients despite their efforts to refuse
treatment because their families,
doctors, or hospitals did not agree
with their decisions or because the
doctors, families, or hospitals were
afraid of legal action from others
who did not agree. Despite the law's
clear position, the right of a
competent patient to refuse medical
treatment if that refusal will result in
death is still more theory than
practice.
Another area in which the legal
response to medical change has fallen
short is the area of organ
transplantation. Obviously the new
organ transplant technology has
made body parts valuable, and the
demand for them greater than the
supply. While ordinarily such
economic problems are solved by the
market, there is fierce disagreement
in our society on the correctness or
rightness of recognizing property
rights in, and of letting a free market
operate to increase the supply of,
body parts available for transplant.
Here again the law has jumped
prematurely and irrationally into the
fray. It has taken a position, through
a combination of federal and state
law, which says, in a nutshell, that a
person's body parts are property
which that person may not sell.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with
the underlying value judgment that
"organ markets" are not desirable, it
seems naive to think that a law
which prohibits the sale of human
organs will make them valueless.
A series of recent newspaper
articles 22 reflects the folly of such an
approach. They report that 30
percent of all kidney transplants in
several hospitals were performed on
foreigners who were allowed to jump
to the head of the line of waiting
Americans. The articles also reported
that in the foreigners' cases, the
surgeons' fees were four times, and
the hospital charges two times, those
charged Americans in similar cases.

The law may prevent the organ
donor from reaping the value of his
or her organs but its net result is that
organs are free goods that can be
harvested by anyone else who can
establish a claim to them.
Assume three parties to the usual
transaction - a donor, a surgical
team, a recipient - and assume
further that the donor would be
willing to donate for $20,000, the
surgical team to do the transplant for
$30,000, and the recipient willing to
pay the total, $50,000. Despite the
law, the organ in question is still
worth $20,000. The intent of the law
was that the value of the organ be
passed on as a gift to the recipient
who would pay $30,000 for the
transplant instead of $50,000. But we
see from the newspaper stories and they have been confirmed,
according to the New York Times,2 3

by the Department of Health and

"It seems naive to think
that a law which
prohibits the sale of
human organs will make
them valueless."

Human Services - that the medical
team or the hospital is getting the
$20,000 in value. And even if the
law, in its naivete, were to prohibit
doctors or hospitals from collecting
that value there would be someone
else who would in their stead.
It is beyond the capability of the
law to make a scarce resource
valueless. The solution, of course, is
to bring supply up to demand. The
law in its wisdom has attempted to
do this by taking the position that an
individual has the right to give away
his or her organs at death and the
law has made it very easy to do so.
You can donate organs when you
apply for a driver's license in most
states; you can donate organs by
filling out a readily available "donor"
card; you can donate organs by
making an ordinary will. This legal
response to the shortage has been
just as unsuccessful as the law's
attempt to devalue the organs
themselves.
On this front, the law didn't
reckon with relatives of the donor
and the medical profession. Though
the donor's gift of organs is made
according to law, and though when a
donor has decided to donate,
relatives have no legal rights in the
matter, doctors refuse to remove
organs if family members object.
Some doctors fear suits from
relatives who don't want the organs
removed - incidentally for the
organs to be usable the donor must
still show some of the traditional
signs of life - the donor must be
breathing and must show a pulse,
though certified as "brain dead".
Some doctors feel the law is wrong
and that family members should
have a say in the matter. Some
doctors fear adverse publicity if they
were to proceed with removal
without the family's consent.
Obviously the propriety of organ
donation is not a subject on which
we all agree. Here again the law
takes a stand but it is not followed.
A Time to Stay Silent
Some suggest that more laws, both
federal and state, can solve these
problems. The most intelligent
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response I've seen to that was from a
Minneapolis Star and Tribune reader.
He wrote:
As a dialysis patient awaiting a kidney
transplant, the last thing I want is ...
legislation ...
as your October 5
editorial advocates ....Rather than
making appeals for legislation ...
you
should direct your editorial efforts
toward a public awareness program
directed at tapping into the large
existing pool [of possible organ
donors] 2.4
So let's have no more legislation
on transplantable organs or on any
of these other insoluble issues. We
might take a leaf from Europe's book
on the subject. What I have in mind
is what is happening in Holland on
the issue of euthanasia.21 While the
national legislature has been
wrestling inconclusively with the
question, the medical profession has
established a procedure for it. Using
the procedure Dutch doctors help
more than 5,000 suffering patients to
die each year. And we could learn as
well from an Englishman -- Lord

Dawson - doctor to King George V.
Dawson made the front page of the
New York Times a couple of weeks
ago. -2 Newly revealed there was the
fact that, relying on his own
conscience, he hastened the king's
death with injections of morphine
and cocaine.
Despite his own practice of
euthanasia, Lord Dawson was
deadset against the passage of laws
legalizing it. He argued against one
in the House of Lords just ten
months after he sped King George off
to heaven. Lord Dawson thought
these matters best left to the
conscience of individual physicians
rather than to official regulators, as
he called lawmakers. He thought that
eventually euthanasia - that is
making the act of dying more gentle
and peaceful even if that involves
curtailing life - would become
increasingly the custom and
ultimately accepted.
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